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payoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we find 
that fines are more effective than bonuses in reducing shirking. However, we do not find that 
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Quantal Response Equilibrium provide a good account of deviations from Nash equilibrium 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many situations where authorities have preferences over individuals’ choices. A tax 
authority wants taxpayers to truthfully report income, an employer wants an employee to work 
hard, a regulator wants a factory to comply with pollution regulations, police want motorists to 
observe speed limits, etc. A fundamental problem for authorities is how to induce compliance 
with desired behavior when individuals have incentives to deviate from such behavior. A 
standard approach is to monitor a proportion of individuals and penalize those caught 
misbehaving. 
To further encourage compliance, the authority may consider rewarding an individual 
who was inspected and found complying. For example, in 2003 the National Tax Service (NTS) 
of Korea introduced a system of bonuses for taxpayers found to have high compliance levels: 
bonuses included benefits such as providing a three-year exemption from tax audit and 
preferential treatment from financial institutions, e.g. reduced interest rates on loans (see NTS 
Annual Report, 2004, p. 31). Alternatively, the authority may consider increasing the sanctions 
on individuals who, upon inspection, are found not complying. For example, the Dutch 
government decided to increase the fine for undeclared savings from 100% to 300% in May 
2009.
1 In this paper we study which of these two mechanisms is most successful in promoting 
good behavior.  
The essence of such situations is captured by the ‘inspection game’, which we describe in 
Section 2. In this game an authority chooses to inspect or not, and an individual chooses to 
comply or not, and the unique Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with positive probabilities 
of inspection and non-compliance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, fines for non-compliant behavior 
increase the equilibrium probability of compliance. On the other hand, and perhaps 
paradoxically, bonuses for compliant behavior reduce the equilibrium probability of compliant 
behavior. Thus, according to standard game theoretical reasoning, fines, and not bonuses, should 
be used to encourage compliance in such settings.  
Previous experiments have revealed limited success of the Nash equilibrium for 
predicting behavior in games where the equilibrium is in mixed strategies (Ochs, 1995; Potters 
and van Winden, 1996; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree et al., 2003). One of the reasons why the 
                                                           




Nash equilibrium does not provide an accurate description of behavior in these types of games is 
that it fails to capture ‘own-payoff effects’: players do change their behavior in response to 
changes in their own payoff, whereas the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts that they will 
not. In the case of the inspection game, the own-payoff effect of introducing fines reinforces the 
theoretically expected effect: fines make non-compliance less attractive to the individual, and so 
the own-payoff effect points toward more compliance. However, the own-payoff effect of 
introducing bonuses for compliant behavior reduces the probability of non-compliance. Thus, 
Nash equilibrium and own-payoff effects point in different directions in this case, and so it is 
unclear whether the theoretical prediction that fines outperform bonuses in encouraging 
compliance will be supported in practice.  
We describe our experiment for comparing the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in 
Section 3. Our inspection game is framed as an employer-worker scenario where an employer 
can either inspect or not and a worker can either supply high or low effort. We designed three 
experimental treatments, each consisting of two parts. The first part was identical across 
treatments: subjects played a control version of the inspection game where the employer pays the 
worker a flat wage, unless she is inspected and found supplying low effort in which case the wage 
is not paid. In the second part of the BONUS treatment, subjects played a version of the game 
where the employer paid an additional bonus to the worker when the employer inspected and the 
worker supplied high effort. In the second part of the FINE treatment, subjects played a version of 
the game where the worker paid a fine to the employer if the employer inspected and the worker 
supplied low effort. Finally, in the second part of the CONTROL treatment, subjects continued 
playing the same game as in the first part. This design allows us to examine whether bonuses or 
fines are more effective in encouraging working/discouraging shirking. In addition, we are able to 
compare the efficiency properties of rewarding versus punishing mechanisms.  
We report our results in Section 4. We find that fines are more effective than bonuses in 
encouraging working and in raising combined earnings. This is in line with standard game 
theoretic predictions.  However, the prediction that bonuses discourage working receives little 
support: although subjects shirk slightly more in the BONUS treatment than CONTROL the 
difference is small and not statistically significant. Moreover, the prediction that introducing 
bonuses will reduce combined earnings is not supported: the losses to employers are almost exactly 
offset by gains to workers. In general, standard comparative static predictions work well when 
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own-payoff effects point in the same direction, but not otherwise. We show that observed 
deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be explained quite well by behavioral theories 
that incorporate loss aversion and can accommodate own payoff effects: Impulse Balance 
Equilibrium (Selten and Chmura, 2008) and an augmented version of Quantal Response 
Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In Section 5 we discuss these results in relation to the 
existing literature and conclude. 
2. INSPECTION GAMES 
We study a simple simultaneous move inspection game. An employer can either inspect (I) or not 
inspect (N), and a worker can supply either high (H) or low (L) effort. In the canonical version of 
the game (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992, p. 17) the employer incurs a cost of h from 
inspecting, and high effort results in the worker incurring a cost of c and the employer receiving 
revenue of v. The employer pays the worker a wage of w, unless the worker supplies low effort and 
the employer inspects. The resulting payoffs are shown in the leftmost panel of Figure 1. We 
assume that all variables are positive and v > c, w > h, w > c. Note that joint payoffs are 
maximized when the worker supplies high effort and the employer does not inspect.  
Figure 1. Inspection Games
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* Employer is ROW player, Worker is COLUMN player. Within each cell, the Employer’s payoff is shown at the 
top and the Worker’s payoff at the bottom. 
Letting p denote the probability of inspection and q denote the probability of supplying 
low effort (‘shirking’), the employer’s expected net benefit from inspecting, that is the expected 
payoff from inspect minus the expected payoff from not inspect, is qw – h. This is the expected 
saving from not having to pay the wage to a shirker less the inspection cost. The worker’s 
expected net benefit from shirking is c – pw; this is the saved effort cost less the expected loss in 
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wages if the employer inspects. The probabilities p and q are determined endogenously and in 
equilibrium must leave the players indifferent between actions, i.e. must result in expected net 
benefits of zero. Thus, in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the employer inspects with 
probability pc = c/w and the worker chooses low with probability qc = h/w. The employer 
receives an expected payoff of πc
employer = v – w – hv/w, the worker receives an expected payoff 
of πc
worker = w – c, and joint payoffs are πc = v – c – hv/w.  
We now compare two possibilities for encouraging high effort relative to the canonical 
version of the game: imposing an additional fine on workers caught supplying low effort, versus 
paying a bonus to workers who are inspected and found supplying high effort.  
Suppose an additional fine f is imposed on a worker caught shirking, resulting in the 
payoff matrix shown in the middle panel of Figure 1. Note that the fine is a transfer between the 
worker and the employer. The employer’s expected net benefit from inspecting is now q(w + f) – 
h and the worker’s expected net benefit from shirking is c – p(w + f). The unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game has the employer inspect with probability pf = c/(w + f) and the worker 
shirk with probability qf = h/(w + f). The imposition of the fine increases the employer’s 
expected payoff to πf 
employer = v – w – hv/(w + f), but does not change the worker’s expected 
payoff, who receives πf 
worker = w – c as in the canonical version of the game. Thus, joint payoffs 
are increased to πf
  = v – c – hv/(w + f). Fines enhance efficiency because joint payoffs are 
reduced by low effort and/or inspection, and both of these are discouraged by a fine on workers 
caught shirking. 
Next, we examine the case where the employer pays a bonus b to a worker who is 
inspected and found to have chosen high effort. The payoff matrix for this game is shown in the 
rightmost panel of Figure 1. The employer’s expected net benefit from inspecting is now qw –  (1 
– q)b – h and the worker’s expected net benefit from shirking is c – p(w + b). Now in 
equilibrium the employer inspects with probability pb = c/(w + b) and thus bonuses reduce the 
probability of inspection. However, in contrast to fines which reduce the probability of shirking, 
bonuses raise the probability of shirking to qb = (h + b)/(w + b). This results in counter-acting 
effects on joint payoffs. Relative to the equilibrium payoffs from the canonical version of the 
game, the worker’s expected payoff is increased to πb 
worker = w – c + cb/(w + b) and the 
inspector’s expected payoff is reduced to πb 




 = (v – c – hv/w) w/(w + b) < πc. Thus, bonuses reduce efficiency because the beneficial effect 
of less frequent inspection is outweighed by the detrimental effect of increased shirking. 
The comparative static predictions made by standard game theory follow from the 
counterintuitive property of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium whereby players’ own decision 
probabilities are determined by the payoff differences of the other player, and not by own payoff 
differences. Figure 2 illustrates this by showing how the expected net benefit of 
inspecting/shirking varies across games.  
Figure 2. Incentives to Shirk and Inspect
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*Expected net benefit for canonical game shown as solid line, for other games shown as dashed line (assuming b = f). 
The left panel shows the worker’s expected net benefit from shirking. Bonuses and fines 
have similar effects on the worker’s payoff: for any given inspection probability the expected 
benefit of shirking is decreased. The right panel shows the employer’ expected net benefit from 
inspecting. Here, for any given shirking probability fines increase the expected benefit of 
inspecting while bonuses decrease it. While the left panel shows that fines and bonuses decrease 
the expected benefit of shirking, the effect on the equilibrium probability of shirking is seen in 
the right panel as the probability of shirking that gives the employers a zero expected net benefit 
from inspecting. Fines are predicted to decrease shirking relative to the canonical version of the 
game because of the impact they have on the employer’s payoff: since the possibility of 
imposing a fine on shirkers makes inspections more attractive for the employer, in equilibrium 
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the worker has to shirk less often relative to the canonical game in order to keep the employer 
indifferent between inspecting and not inspecting. Similarly, the perverse effect of bonuses on 
shirking follows from the decreased attractiveness of inspections in the game with bonuses 
relative to the canonical game: since the employer has now to pay a bonus to a worker who is 
found supplying high effort, a worker has to shirk more often to keep the employer indifferent 
between her two options. In the same way, the changes in the frequency of inspections in the 
inspection games with fines and bonuses relative to the canonical version of the game are a 
consequence of the impact of fines and bonuses on the worker’s payoff.  
Previous experimental work (e.g., Ochs, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree et al., 
2003) shows that these counterintuitive Nash equilibrium predictions are often rejected by the 
data: changing a player’s own payoff does have an impact on that player’s decision probabilities. 
Goeree and Holt (2001) observe own-payoff effects in one-shot games; Ochs (1995) and Goeree 
et al. (2003) observe own-payoff effects even after players have had ample opportunities to learn. 
Note that own-payoff effects may either reinforce or counteract equilibrium forces. Introducing 
bonuses into the inspection game generates an own-payoff effect that pulls workers’ behavior in 
the opposite direction to Nash equilibrium predictions: shirking is less attractive when bonuses 
are paid to workers who supply high effort, and hence the supply of high effort is encouraged. 
On the other hand, introducing fines generates an own-payoff effect that pulls workers’ behavior 
in the same direction as Nash equilibrium: imposing a fine on shirkers makes shirking less 
attractive and hence encourages the supply of high effort. Similarly, own-payoff effects reinforce 
Nash equilibrium predictions about inspection probabilities in the inspection game with bonuses, 
but counteract Nash equilibrium predictions in inspection games with fines. 
In summary, given the evidence on the importance of own-payoff effects in previous 
experiments, it is not clear that experimental evidence will support the standard game theoretical 
analysis outlined above. In particular, the own-payoff effects arising when bonuses are paid to 
workers who are inspected and found supplying high effort may make them a more effective tool 
for encouraging effort than suggested by standard theory.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
The experiment consisted of fifteen sessions at the University of Nottingham. Ten subjects 
participated in each session. Subjects were recruited from a campus-wide distribution list and no 
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subject participated in more than one session.
2 No communication between subjects was 
permitted throughout a session. 
At the beginning of a session subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals and 
were informed that the experimental session would consist of two parts, during each of which 
they could earn ‘points’. Subjects were also told that their cash earnings for the session would be 
based on all points accumulated in both parts of the experiment.  
Instructions for Part One were then distributed and read aloud. At the end of these 
subjects had to answer a series of questions to test their comprehension of the instructions. A 
monitor checked the answers and dealt with any questions in private. Part One then consisted of 
40 rounds. At the beginning of the first round subjects learned their role: five subjects were 
assigned the role of ‘Employer’ and five the role of ‘Worker’. Subjects kept these roles for the 
entire session (i.e. for both Part One and Part Two). Across rounds subjects were randomly 
matched in pairs consisting of one Employer and one Worker, and in each round each pair 
played the canonical inspection game shown in the rightmost panel of Figure 3.
3 At the end of 
each round subjects were informed of their own and their opponents’ choices and point earnings. 
Subjects were also shown their accumulated point earnings and a table with the distribution of 
choices across all subjects in the session for the previous twenty rounds.  
Figure 3. Parameterization of the Inspection Games Used in the Experiment
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* Employer is ROW player, Worker is COLUMN player. Within each cell, the Employer’s payoff is shown at the 
top and the Worker’s payoff at the bottom. 
                                                           
2 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).  Instructions are available 
in Appendix A. 
3 Point earnings were derived from the game described in the previous section (see Figure 1) with v = 60, c = 15, h = 
8, w = 20, and with 20 points added to all outcomes to ensure that subjects could not make losses in any of the 
games used in the experiment. These parameters were chosen so that Nash equilibrium probabilities are not too 
close to 0, 0.5 or 1 (all probabilities lie in the intervals [0.2, 0.4] or [0.6, 0.8]). We also sought separation between 
games with and without bonuses or fines so that, where a change in behavior is predicted by standard theory, the 
predicted change in probabilities across games is at least 20 percentage points. 
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At the end of Part One subjects were given instructions for Part Two, which were then 
read aloud. These explained that the second part consisted of another 80 rounds, again with 
pairings randomly determined at the beginning of each round. In our five CONTROL sessions 
these rounds used the same earnings table as in Part One. In our five FINE sessions the earnings 
table was as in Part One except that the worker would pay a fine of 20 points to the employer if 
the worker chose low effort and the employer chose to inspect. Thus in Part Two of the 
experiment subjects in the FINE sessions played the inspection game shown in the middle panel 
of Figure 3. In our five BONUS sessions the earnings table was as in Part One except that the 
employer would pay a bonus of 20 points to the worker if the worker chose high effort and the 
employer chose to inspect (rightmost panel of Figure 3).  
At the end of Part Two subjects were paid in cash according to their accumulated point 
earnings from all rounds using an exchange rate of £0.004 per point. Sessions took about 40 
minutes on average and earnings ranged between £10.2 and £23.1, averaging £14.9 
(approximately US$24 at the time of the experiment). 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Inspection and Shirking Probabilities 
Figure 4 displays the smoothed proportions of inspecting and shirking decisions across all the 
rounds of the experiment. For some cases there is a clear change in behavior in round 41, 
following the transition from Part One to Part Two and the introduction of fines or bonuses, but 
otherwise the observed proportions appear quite stable across rounds. Table 1 reports the 
proportions of shirking and inspecting over the last 20 rounds of each Part of the experiment. 
The Nash equilibrium predictions for choice probabilities are also reported for comparison.  
The first 40 rounds of the experiment (Part One) are common to the three treatments, and 
we do not find any significant differences in the proportions of shirking or inspecting across 
treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test p-values are 0.37 for shirk and 0.78 for inspect).
4 Averaged 
across all sessions the observed proportion of shirking decisions is 45% and the observed 
proportion of inspecting decisions is 78%: both statistics compare favorably with predictions 
made by Nash equilibrium (40% and 75%, respectively). 
                                                           
4 Our non-parametric analysis is based on two-tailed tests applied to 5 independent observations per treatment. We 
consider data from each session as one independent observation. Tests are applied to averages based on the last 20 
rounds of each Part of the experiment. The data analysis does not lead to different results if we focus on all rounds. 
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Figure 4. Proportions of Shirking (left panel) and Inspecting (right panel) across Treatments
* 
 
*In each round, the average is displayed of the proportions of (max) 5 previous rounds, the current round and (max) 
5 future rounds. 
 
Table 1. Choice Proportions, Average by Treatment
*  
 Part  One  Part  Two 
 CONTROL  FINE  BONUS  CONTROL  FINE  BONUS 
Proportion of Shirking  0.39  0.52  0.45  0.44  0.23  0.50 
Nash 0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.20  0.70 
Proportion of Inspecting  0.80  0.77  0.78  0.81  0.62  0.45 
Nash 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.375  0.375 
* Table shows the proportion of shirking/inspecting decisions in the last 20 rounds of each Part of the experiment. 
In Part Two of the experiment the proportions of shirking and inspecting diverge 
significantly across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test: p = 0.02 for shirk, and p = 0.01 for inspect). 
Clearly, the changes in payoff matrices introduced in Part Two of the different treatments caused 
subjects to adjust their behavior. For pair-wise statistical comparisons between treatments we use 
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. As predicted, we find less shirking in FINE (23%) than in 
CONTROL (44%), and the difference is statistically significant (p = 0.02). Although Nash 
equilibrium predicts workers will shirk considerably more in BONUS than in CONTROL (70% 
vs. 40%), shirking in BONUS is only slightly higher than in CONTROL (50% vs. 44%), and the 
difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.55). As for inspection probabilities, these are 
significantly lower in FINE than CONTROL (p = 0.01) and BONUS than CONTROL (p = 0.01). 
We also note, however, that the inspection probability in FINE is considerably higher than 
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predicted (62% vs. 37.5%), while the proportion of inspections in BONUS is closer to the 
theoretical level (45% vs. 37.5%). In fact, whereas Nash equilibrium predicts that introducing 
bonuses and fines have the same effect on inspection probabilities, we find a statistically 
significant difference in the proportions of inspections between FINE and BONUS (p = 0.01). 
4.2 Earnings 
Table 2 reports average earnings per game across treatments in the last 20 rounds of Part 
Two of the experiment. Nash equilibrium predictions are also reported for comparison.  
Table 2. Earnings in Part Two, Average by Treatment
* 
 Part  Two 
 CONTROL  FINE  BONUS 
Joint Earnings  58.7 (5.75)  69.6 (2.64)  58.9 (2.40) 
Nash 61.0  73.0  50.5 
Worker Earnings  24.2 (1.08)  22.5(1.38) 32.7
 (1.01) 
Nash 25.0  25.0  32.5 
Employer Earnings  34.5 (5.11)  47.1 (1.35)  26.1 (2.30) 
Nash 36.0  48.0  18.0 
* Table shows average point earnings per game (last 20 rounds only). Standard 
deviations based on session averages in parentheses. 
In principle, joint earnings can range from 32 points (when the employer inspects and the 
worker shirks) to 85 (when the employer does not inspect and the worker works). Theory 
predicts that joint earnings are equal to 61 points in the game used in CONTROL. In the 
experiment, earnings in our CONTROL sessions are close to this, averaging 58.7 points across 
the last 20 rounds of Part Two. Theory also predicts that fines are beneficial and bonuses are 
detrimental for efficiency. Using Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, we find that, consistent with 
these predictions, joint earnings in FINE are higher than in CONTROL, and the difference in the 
distributions is statistically significant (p = 0.01). On the contrary, we find no evidence that 
bonuses hamper efficiency: in fact, introducing bonuses slightly increases on average joint 
earnings relative to CONTROL, although the effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.85).  
A second aspect of our data is worth discussing: while according to Nash equilibrium the 
introduction of fines is Pareto improving, as it is predicted to leave the workers’ earnings 
unchanged relative to CONTROL and to increase the employer’s payoff, we find that fines are in 
fact detrimental for workers. In FINE, workers earn about 1.5 points per game less than in 
CONTROL, and the difference is (weakly) statistically significant (p = 0.06). Fines are instead 
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beneficial for the employer as predicted (p = 0.01). Thus, the introduction of fines has 
distributive consequences that are not accounted for by standard theory: employers are better off 
when fines are introduced, but this occurs at the expenses of workers who are worse off relative 
to CONTROL. The introduction of bonuses has instead the predicted distributive consequences: 
it significantly increases the worker’s payoff and decreases the employer’s payoff (p = 0.01 and 
p = 0.02 respectively).  
4.3 Explaining Observed Behavior 
Whereas Nash equilibrium predictions seem to capture well the comparative static effects 
of fines on shirking behavior and bonuses on inspecting behavior, they do not capture observed 
effects of fines on inspections or bonuses on effort. It is notable that the instances where Nash 
predictions fail are those where own-payoff effects, as discussed in Section 2, work in the 
opposite direction to equilibrium effects. 
Table 3 contains predicted choice probabilities made by two alternative concepts: Quantal 
Response Equilibrium (QRE) and Impulse Balance Equilibrium (IBE).
5 The predictions are for 
our Part Two data. Part One data is used to estimate the QRE precision parameter λ.
6 For the 
estimated value of λ QRE predictions are generally close to Nash equilibrium predictions.  
Table 3. Predicted Choice Probabilities 
 Probability  of  Shirking  Probability of Inspecting 
  CONTROL FINE  BONUS  CONTROL FINE  BONUS 
Nash 0.40  0.20  0.70  0.75  0.375  0.375 
QRE (λ=0.989) 0.46  0.19  0.68  0.76  0.41  0.35 
IBE 0.41  0.16  0.43  0.68  0.61  0.40 
Nash
with loss-aversion 0.25  0.11  0.54  0.60  0.23  0.33 
QRE
with loss-aversion (λ=0.289)  0.42 0.10  0.46 0.69 0.47 0.36 
IBE is based on the idea that players look at forgone payoffs when they adjust their 
decision probabilities: choosing an option that yields a lower payoff than the alternative option 
generates an ‘impulse’ in the direction of the non-chosen option. Impulses generated by foregone 
                                                           
5 Appendix B contains details on the procedures used to derive the equilibrium predictions for IBE and QRE. 
6 When λ = 0 players choose actions equi-probably and in the limit as λ approaches ∞ players always choose their 
best-response. As in Selten and Chmura (2008) and Brunner et al. (forthcoming), we calculate the best fitting overall 
estimate for λ in our data by minimizing the sum of mean squared distances of the predicted QRE probabilities from 
the observed session-averaged choice probabilities in the experiment. This yields an estimated λ of 0.989. Unlike 
these authors, who use all data to estimate λ, we estimate the parameter using data from Part One of the experiment 
and then use this estimated value of λ to predict behavior in Part Two of the experiment.  
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payoffs that represent a ‘loss’ relative to a player’s security payoff level (her pure strategy 
maximin value) weigh twice as much as foregone ‘gains’. In equilibrium, players choose the 
decision probabilities such that the impulses of foregone payoffs are equal across options. IBE 
predictions differ markedly from Nash equilibrium when own payoff and Nash equilibrium 
effects are in conflict: the IBE predicted probability of shirking in BONUS is 43% (versus the 
70% Nash prediction) and the predicted probability of inspecting in FINE is 61% (versus 
37.5%). 
 The fact that Nash equilibrium and QRE are not augmented by loss-aversion while IBE 
is has generated a recent debate about whether the incorporation of loss-aversion is what drives 
the observed differences in performance across these equilibrium concepts (see Selten and 
Chmura, 2008; Brunner et al., forthcoming; Goerg et al., forthcoming). To examine this 
possibility, Table 3 also reports predictions made by Nash equilibrium and QRE when these 
concepts are augmented with loss-aversion.
7 Incorporating loss-aversion into the concepts 
generally improves the performance of QRE, but not the performance of Nash equilibrium.  
Overall, the comparative static effects observed in our experiment are generally better 
captured by IBE and QRE with loss-aversion than by Nash equilibrium analysis or by QRE 
without loss-aversion. This is summarized in Figure 5. The Figure shows how the introduction of 
bonuses and fines affect the probability of shirking and inspecting relative to CONTROL 
according to the three solution concepts, as well as in the data for the last 20 rounds of Part Two.  
Figure 5. Changes in Shirk (left) and Inspect (right) after introduction of Bonuses and Fines. 
 
                                                           
7 As in Selten and Chmura (2008) we incorporate loss aversion by transforming payoffs above the security level as 
follows. If x is the payoff and m is the security level, any payoff x > m is transformed into x’ = m + (x-m)/2. The 
exact procedure is discussed in Appendix B. 
12 
  
When Nash equilibrium effects and own-payoff effects work in the same direction (i.e. 
for the impact of fines on shirking and the impact of bonuses on inspections) there is little to 
choose among the various solution concepts. When Nash equilibrium effects and own payoff 
effects work in opposite directions (i.e. for the impact of fines on inspecting and the impact of 
bonuses on shirking), Nash equilibrium (with or without loss-aversion) is outperformed by the 
alternative concepts. Among these, IBE and QRE augmented by loss-aversion perform better 
than QRE without loss-aversion. Nash equilibrium predicts that bonuses increase shirking by 
30% relative to CONTROL, whereas shirking only increases by about 6% in our data. This 
observed effect compares quite favorably with the comparative static predictions made by IBE (a 
predicted 2% increase in shirking) and QRE augmented by loss-aversion (a predicted 4% 
increase), but not with the comparative static predictions made by QRE without loss-aversion (a 
predicted 22% increase). Similarly, Nash equilibrium predicts that fines reduce inspection rate by 
about 37% relative to CONTROL, whereas inspection rates actually fall by about 19%. QRE 
without loss-aversion predicts a decrease in inspecting by 35%, whereas the predicted magnitude 
of the decrease is smaller in IBE and QRE with loss-aversion (about 20% or less).  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We compare the effectiveness of bonuses and fines as instruments for encouraging 
compliance in inspection games. In our setting the incentive for a worker to work is given by the 
monitoring activity of an employer and the costs/benefits incurred by the worker when she is 
inspected and found to have worked or shirked. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is in 
mixed strategies with positive probabilities of inspection and shirking. We find that bonuses 
targeted at those inspected and found working are not effective in encouraging working: in fact, 
subjects in our experiment shirk slightly more often when bonuses are present, although the 
effect is not statistically significant. On the other hand, we find that introducing harsher fines for 
shirkers is an effective tool for encouraging working.  
The question of whether rewards or punishments are a better tool for inducing socially 
desirable behavior has been addressed in previous experimental work. Most of the literature has 
used two-stage games where in the second stage, after having observed choices made in the first 
stage, players can incur costs to punish or reward other players. Players are not predicted to use 
costly rewards or punishments if they are solely concerned about own earnings, but they might if 
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they have preferences for reciprocity. In fact, a large experimental literature documents the 
willingness of some people to eschew private interests and react positively toward those that treat 
them well (positive reciprocity) or negatively toward those that treat them poorly (negative 
reciprocity). In particular, early studies of games that allow for both positive and negative 
reciprocity found that the latter has a particularly strong impact (Abbink et al., 2000; Offerman, 
2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002). These findings are echoed in Andreoni et al. (2003) who 
investigate the effects of rewards and punishments in a proposer-responder game where the 
proposer chooses an amount to transfer to the responder and the responder can then either punish 
or reward the proposer. They find that proposers’ transfers are particularly sensitive to the threat 
of punishment, although rewards have also positive effects. Similarly, Sefton et al. (2007) 
examine the effect of rewards and punishments on contributions in a repeated public good game 
and find that punishments help subjects to sustain higher cooperation levels compared to a 
control game with no reward/punishment opportunities, whereas the possibility of rewards has 
only a transient effect.
8 
Our research differs from these studies in that we do not study discretionary, or informal, 
rewards and punishments, but we rather focus on formal bonuses and fines that are automatically 
triggered after specific combinations of actions chosen by the players.
9 Moreover, we study 
bonuses and fines that are pure transfers from one party to another, and so have no direct 
efficiency implications. Thus, bonuses or fines can only enhance performance to the extent that 
they succeed in inducing behavior that is more aligned with the group interest. Finally, unlike 
previous research on the effect of rewards/ punishments in social dilemmas, in our game 
standard theory predicts that bonuses and fines will affect performance. 
Most closely related to our work is Rauhut (2009) who studies the impact of the severity 
of the punishment in an inspection game. His set up differs from ours in that the punishment 
                                                           
8 More recent research has shown that the effectiveness of rewards and punishments in settings such as this depends 
on the rewarding/punishing technology. Sutter et al. (2010) find that when the benefit/cost of receiving 
reward/punishment is three times larger than the cost of delivering it (i.e. with a 3:1 technology), both mechanisms 
are effective in encouraging contributions. Similarly, Rand et al. (2009) find that rewards are as effective as 
punishments in sustaining cooperation in a repeated public good game experiment with unknown time horizon and 
with a 3:1 reward/punishment technology. Gürerk et al. (2006) study a public good game where the rewarding 
mechanism displays a 1:1 technology and a punishment mechanism displays a 3:1 technology. They find that only 
the latter have an impact on contributions. Gürerk et al. (2009) use a public goods game where one group member 
(the ‘leader’) can reward or punish the other contributors. Although both rewarding and punishment mechanisms 
display a 3:1 technology, they find that contributions are higher when punishments are used.  
9 See Dickinson (2001) for a public good game experiment where rewards/punishments points are automatically 
assigned to the highest/lowest contributor in the group. 
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hurts the inspectee but does not affect the payoff of the inspector in any way. A consequence is 
that an increase in the punishment decreases the probability of inspection but leaves the 
probability of shirking unaffected in the Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, he finds that inspectees 
shirk less often when the punishment is increased, in agreement with the own-payoff effect.
10 
Our paper differs from his also in that we study reward as well as punishment. As far as we are 
aware ours is the first paper to experimentally compare positive and negative incentives in 
inspection games.  
Our study also contributes to a recent literature evaluating different solution concepts for 
predicting behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria (e.g., Selten and Chmura, 2008; 
Brunner et al., forthcoming; Goerg, et al., forthcoming). Standard game theoretical analysis 
applied to the game used in our experiment yields the perhaps paradoxical result that introducing 
bonuses increases considerably the probability that the employee will shirk. While in our 
experiment we do observe a slight increase in shirking in the presence of bonuses, this effect is 
much smaller than predicted by Nash equilibrium and is not statistically significant. This is more 
in line with the predictions made by alternative concepts such as Impulse Balance Equilibrium 
and Quantal Response Equilibrium (although, for our data, the latter concept performs better 
than Nash equilibrium only if it incorporates loss aversion). More generally, our results show 
that when Nash equilibrium and alternative predictions diverge we find more support for the 
latter than for the former. 
In this study we have focused on the case where rewards and punishments are simple 
transfers between the interacting parties (e.g. monetary fines for misconduct or bonuses for good 
conduct). This seems to be a useful starting point as the connections between incentives, 
behavior, and earnings are straightforward to interpret: bonuses and fines have no direct 
efficiency consequences unless they induce a change in behavior. We find that fines, but not 
bonuses, enhance efficiency. An interesting extension would be one where the costs and benefits 
of rewarding/being rewarded are asymmetric (e.g., when bonuses consist of medals and prizes, 
that may have more value for the person receiving them than for the person awarding them). If 
the bonus remains equally costly to the inspector while it becomes more beneficial to the 
inspectee, our results suggest that the inspectee will shirk less often because of the enhanced 
                                                           
10 In fact, Rauhut studies a game where two inspectors interact with two inspectees who are involved in a prisoners’ 
dilemma. Under some assumptions, this expanded game has the same characteristics as an inspection game. 
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own-payoff effect of working. Thus, in such a setup bonuses may have a positive effect on 
inspectees’ good behavior. Also, in this study we examine the performance of exogenously 
imposed mechanisms. In our experiment, workers chose whether to work or shirk and employers 
chose whether to inspect or not inspect. Fines and bonuses were then triggered automatically in 
response to the actions chosen by the players. Another interesting avenue for further research 
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This is an experiment about decision-making. In the room, there are ten people who are 
participating in this experiment. You must not communicate with any other participant in any 
way during the experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in private and in cash. 
The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions that you and the other participants 
make. The experiment consists of two parts, each part consisting of a number of rounds. In each 
round you can earn points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid according to the sum of 
your total point earnings from all rounds in both parts at a rate of 0.4 pence per point. You will 
receive the instructions for the second part after the first part is finished. 
Part One 
At the beginning of Part One five of the participants will get the role of "employers" and five 
will get the role of "workers". You will find out whether you are an employer or worker when 
the decision-making part of the experiment begins. If you are an employer you will remain an 
employer throughout the first part, and if you are a worker you will remain a worker throughout 
the first part.  
Part One will consist of 40 rounds. In each round the employers will be paired with the workers. 
Thus, if you are an employer you will be paired with one of the workers, and if you are a worker 
you will be paired with one of the employers. The people you are paired with will change 
randomly from round to round.  
At the beginning of a round all participants will make their decisions. Employers must choose 
either INSPECT or NOT INSPECT. Workers must choose either HIGH effort or LOW effort. At 
the end of the round, after everyone has made their decision, the computer will inform you of the 
choices made by you and the person you were paired with and your point earnings for the round. 
The number of points you earn in a round will depend on the decisions made by you and the 
person you are paired with in that round, as described in the tables below: 
Employer’s point earnings    Worker’s point earnings 
 HIGH  LOW    HIGH  LOW 
INSPECT 52  12    INSPECT 25  20 
NOT INSPECT  60  0    NOT INSPECT  25  40 
For example, if the employer chooses NOT INSPECT and the worker chooses LOW the 
employer earns 0 points and the worker earns 40 points. 
In addition, on your screen you will see your accumulated point earnings so far, and a table 
summarizing the decisions made by all participants in previous rounds. The table will be like the 
one shown below (although the data in the table has been chosen for illustrative purposes only: in 
the experiment the data will correspond to the actual decisions made by participants).  
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Results of last 20 rounds 
 HIGH  LOW  Total 
INSPECT 10%  20% 30% 
NOT INSPECT  30%  40%  70% 
Total 40%  60%  100% 
For example, the table tells you that the combination (INSPECT, HIGH) occurred in 10% of the 
cases, that the employers chose INSPECT in 30% of the cases, and the workers chose HIGH in 
40% of the cases. The table is based on the results of the most recent 20 rounds only. 
 
To make sure everyone understands the instructions so far, please complete the questions 




1.  Will you be matched with the same person from round to round? _____ 
 
 
2.  How many points will you earn in a round if you are an employer, choose NOT 
INSPECT, and the worker you are matched with chooses HIGH? ______ 
 
 
3.  How many points will you earn in a round if you are a worker, choose HIGH, and 
the employer you are matched with chooses NOT INSPECT? ______ 
 
 
4.  Is the following statement true: the screen summarizing the history so far always 
contains information on all previous rounds     ____ 
 
 
5.  Is the following statement true: the screen summarizing the history so far contains 





In Part Two you will keep the same role as you had in Part One. Again, you will be matched with 
a different person in the other role in each round. Part Two will consist of an additional 80 
rounds, starting with round 41 and ending after round 120. Your decisions together with the 
decisions of the people that you will be matched with will determine your earnings that will be 
added to your total earnings in points from Part One. At the beginning of a round, employers 
must again choose either INSPECT or NOT INSPECT, while workers must choose either HIGH 
effort or LOW effort. At the end of the round, the computer will inform you of the outcome of 
the round for you and the person you are paired with. 
[CONTROL: The point earnings that the employer and worker receive in each of the four cases 
(INSPECT, HIGH); (INSPECT, LOW); (NOT INSPECT, HIGH); (NOT INSPECT, LOW) will 
remain exactly the same as in Part One, as shown below.  
Employer’s point earnings    Worker’s point earnings 
 HIGH  LOW    HIGH  LOW 
INSPECT 52  12    INSPECT 25  20 
NOT INSPECT  60  0    NOT INSPECT  25  40 
] 
[FINE: The only difference between Part One and Two will be that the worker will pay a fine of 
20 points to the employer when the worker was inspected and chose low effort. So after 
INSPECT and LOW the employer’s point earnings increase by 20 points and the worker’s point 
earnings decrease by 20 points, as shown in the tables below: 
Employer’s point earnings    Worker’s point earnings 
 HIGH  LOW    HIGH  LOW 
INSPECT 52  32    INSPECT 25 0 
NOT INSPECT  60  0    NOT INSPECT  25  40 
Thus, if the employer chooses INSPECT and the worker chooses LOW the employer earns 32 
points and the worker earns 0 points. In all other cases the payoffs remain the same as in Part 
One.] 
[BONUS: The only difference between Part One and Two will be that the employer will give a 
reward of 20 points to the worker when he or she inspected the worker and found out that the 
worker chose high effort. So after INSPECT and HIGH the employer’s point earnings decrease 
by 20 points and the worker’s point earnings increase by 20 points, as shown in the new earnings 
tables below:  
Employer’s point earnings    Worker’s point earnings 
 HIGH  LOW    HIGH  LOW 
INSPECT 32  12    INSPECT 45  20 
NOT INSPECT  60  0    NOT INSPECT  25  40 
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Thus, if the employer chooses INSPECT and the worker chooses HIGH the employer earns 32 
points and the worker earns 45 points. In all other cases the payoffs remain the same as in Part 
One.] 
As before, your screen will display your accumulated point earnings (including your earnings 
from Part One). You will also see a table summarizing the decisions made by all participants in 
previous rounds. At the start of period 41, this table will be empty. The table will again list the 
results of the most recent 20 rounds after round 41. 
Ending the session 
At the end of round 120 your total points from all rounds will be converted to cash at a rate of 
0.4 pence per point and you will be paid this amount in private and in cash. Now please begin 




In this appendix, we explain the procedure to derive the equilibrium predictions of IBE and QRE 
with loss aversion in the context of the canonical inspection game. Selten and Chmura (2008) 
provide a more general discussion for IBE and Brunner et al. (forthcoming) for QRE.  
In IBE, players judge the payoffs according to how they relate to their security level. A 
player’s security level s is determined by the player’s pure maximin payoff, the maximum of the 
minimum payoffs corresponding to the player’s actions. The left panel of Figure B.1 presents the 
canonical inspection game, in which the inspector can secure a payoff of 12 and the worker a 
payoff of 25. The payoff matrix is then transformed to account for loss aversion in the following 
way. From each payoff exceeding a player’s security level half the difference between the payoff 
and the security level is subtracted (the other payoffs remain unchanged). Or, each payoff x is 
replaced by x – max{½(x – s),0}. As a consequence, losses compared to the reference point 
weigh twice the amount that gains weigh. The middle panel of Figure B.1 presents the 
Transformed inspection game. From the Transformed game, the Impulse matrix is derived with 
the following procedure. Each set of two payoffs of a player corresponding to the same action of 
the other player is transformed such that the highest payoff becomes 0 and the lowest becomes 
the difference between the highest and the lowest. The resulting numbers represent the impulses 
to choose the other action given the action chosen by the other player. The impulse matrix is 
presented in the right panel of Figure B.1. 
Figure B.1 Canonical game, Transformed game and Impulse matrix 
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In the IBE, a player’s expected impulse from one action to the other equals the expected impulse 
from the other action to the one action. Let p represent the probability that the employer chooses 
I, and q the probability that the worker chooses L, then p and q follow from the solution of the 
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In QRE, players maximize expected utility taking the actual response function of the other player 
into account, but make mistakes. Let Eplayer[a] represent a player’s expected utility from choosing 
action a, then: 
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where λ represents the player’s rationality parameter that is estimated from the data. For QRE 
with loss aversion, the payoffs of the Transformed inspection game are used. In this case, p and q 
follow from the solution of: 
 





== [32(1 ) 12 ] [36(1 )] [25] [20 32.5(1 )] qq q p p ee e e
λλ λ λ −+ − + − ++
 
The QRE prediction for the game without loss aversion is similarly found using the ordinary 
payoffs listed in the left panel of Figure B.1. 